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Chapter 6:
Institutional Design and Good Governance   
B. Guy Peters   
Much of the discussion of ‘good governance’ has defined that term as virtu-
ally synonymous with the fight against corruption. For example, the indices
created by the World Bank and other international organizations focus on the
capacity of governments to suppress corruption or other forms of irregular
governing (Kaufmann/Kraay/Mastruzzi 2007; Transparency International
2008). Associated with that approach to limiting corruption, there has been a
great deal of emphasis on accountability and transparency in the public sec-
tor. These measures also indirectly assess the capacity of these political sys-
tems to control corruption and to enforce proper standards of behavior within
the public sector.
The task for this paper is to relate the institutional design of political sys-
tems to the quality of governance provided by a government, or perhaps more
precisely the quality of governance that is provided by the overall system of
governing. That is, we need to extend questions of institutional design be-
yond the formal limits of governments also to consider how to design the in-
teraction between state and society in ways that facilitate the quality of gov-
ernance, defined broadly, as well as to minimize the probability of corrupt
practices. Indeed, somewhat paradoxically, some attempts to enhance effi-
ciency and democracy have had the unintended consequence of creating more
opportunities for corruption.
We also need to bring institutional theory to bear on questions of corrup-
tion and good governance. Institutional theory is itself rather diverse, but
several of the strands within the theory have direct relevance for understand-
ing corruption. Most clearly, the normative version of institutionalism associ-
ated with March and Olsen (1989) stresses the central role of ‘appropriate-
ness’ within organizations and institutions and assumes that individual
behaviors, including eschewing corruption, can be shaped by institutional
values, symbols, myths and routines. Those values will, of course, have to be
positive if they are to have a positive impact on behavior.1 In this approach,
                                                          
1 By positive here I mean values that support the functioning of the institution with corrup-
tion.
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therefore, corruption is understood as rejecting the values of public organiza-
tions in pursuit of personal gain – the consequentialist approach to political
life that is rejected by normative institutionalists.
The rational choice approach to institutions is an alternative that can help
understand the observed behavior of individuals who are presented with the
opportunity for corruption. In particular, institutions contain a set of rules that
can be used to control individuals. Those rules may be in the form of incentives
or in terms of prohibitions. Further, the rules may be the result of constructivist
processes in which interactions between formal and informal structures, e.g.
cultures, shape the expectations about the behavior of individuals within the
society (see Collier 2002). Those rules may be confined to the particular insti-
tutional arena or it may be framed more broadly for a range of structures.
1. Institutional Design and Political Choices
This task that I have been set also raises interesting theoretical questions
about the extent to which institutions can constrain individual behavior. That
ability of institutions to constrain individual action is always an assumption
of institutional theorists (Ostrom 1990) but it often remains just an assump-
tion and rarely has it been thoroughly tested. It is clear from the available
evidence that an institutional structure can shape the strategic behavior of
legislators and voters, but it is perhaps less clear that institutions can effec-
tively shape the moral behavior of individual politicians or administrators.
The differences among regimes being discussed in this paper represent dif-
ferent sets of institutions that may or may not be able to constrain behavior.
To some extent the capacity we assign to institutions is a function of the
conception that we have of institutions. For example, if we begin with the
normative model of March and Olsen (1986), and a number of sociologists,
then controlling moral choices may be considered central to the definition of
the institution. If, however, we adopt a more structuralist conception of an in-
stitution, e.g. one based on veto points, then making the link to behavior is
more difficult. In such a view preferences are largely exogenous, so the po-
tentially corrupt politician or administrator will simply have to work his or
her way through more or less complex structures in order to achieve their
goals – whether corrupt or noble. In this perspective the solution for corrup-
tion may be to construct more veto points, with stricter enforcement, but that
will not be a guarantee.2
We could also adopt a more common sense, descriptive approach to in-
stitutions and examine the impact of some empirical structures on the ability
of political regimes to govern effectively and to govern in an open and trans-
                                                          
2 The logic becomes that of qui custodient ipsos custodes, with a potentially infinite number
of layers of control over behaviors.
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parent manner. Weaver and Rockman and their colleagues (1996), for exam-
ple, provided an extensive analysis of the differences in performance between
presidential and parliamentary political systems (see also the discussion of
Schmidt (2002) below). These analyses have been concerned more with the
capacity of these systems to make and deliver policy rather than with their
capacity to do so in a non-corrupt manner. As will be discussed in more de-
tail below there may be some theoretical linkage between political structures
and the level of corruption in the system. In particular, the greater the com-
plexity involved in making decisions the more functional corrupt practice
may be for any political system.
2. Corruption and Irregular Politics
The term corruption is used rather broadly to capture a range of behaviors
that are beyond the pale of what is now commonly accepted behavior in the
industrialized democracies. Corruption is, however, often like Justice Potter
Stewart’s idea of pornography – he could not define it but knew it when he
saw it. Some behaviors, e.g. bribery, ‘kickbacks’, nepotism, and the like are
clearly corrupt (see Philip 2002). These behaviors undermine fairness and
probity in governing and make it apparent to the public that appropriate stan-
dards of integrity are not being followed by their public officials. These be-
haviors have been the targets of numerous efforts at reform from interna-
tional organizations and national governments.
Other practices, however, represent informal styles of political behavior
that may not be as overtly illegal but which still may undermine any sense of
equality and fairness in the political system, and therefore tend to foster pub-
lic cynicism about the political system. For example, clientelism has been a
familiar description of political life in Southern Europe (Piatoni 2001), Latin
America (Blake/Morris 2009) and other parts of the world (Kawata 2008).
The basic idea of clientelism is that a politically powerful patron provides fa-
vors to his/her clients in exchange for political support. Those favors may be
of a variety of sorts but generally include some form of divisible goods cre-
ated by the public sector, especially public jobs. It should be observed here,
however, that these patterns of behavior are institutionalized, so that govern-
ing institutions may themselves be corrupt and require other remedies to cre-
ate more circumspect behaviors.
But where does clientelism end and proper government begin? For exam-
ple, in the United States members of Congress tend to base a significant part
of their appeals to their constituents on their ability to ‘bring home the ba-
con’. Fiorina (1992) has argued that whenever Congressmen in the United
States take stances on policy they tend to alienate at least a portion of their
voters, but if they merely ensure that there is spending in the district and
good constituency service then they alienate no one (except perhaps voters
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especially interested in fiscal responsibility). The increased use of ‘ear-
marked’ expenditures has meant that those Congressmen interested in fiscal
probity often do not have an opportunity even to become aware of the ‘pork’
until it has been enacted into law.
This pork-barrel component of public expenditure is a form of ‘collective
clientelism’. The patron in the national capital provides benefits for constitu-
ents in exchange for their votes. The deal involved in this relationship is
never expressed quite so directly, but that is the deal nonetheless. The clien-
telistic character of pork-barrel spending in the United States has been rein-
forced by the use of Congressional earmarks that tend to produce very par-
ticular benefits for localities or for organizations, and make the linkage
between the patron and the numerous members of the clientele all the more
obvious. Although more explicit in the US than in most other places, this ter-
ritorial form of patronage is certainly found elsewhere (Tavits 2009).
It appears that in some ways scholars and practitioners tend to be more
concerned with corruption on the retail than the wholesale level. That is, a
large proportion of the efforts directed at reducing corruption have been ad-
dressed at relatively minor administrative corruption, while large-scale use of
the power of the public sector for partisan and individual gain seems to be
more accepted. This emphasis may be a function of the relative power posi-
tions of the actors, or there may still be some sense that certain types of ir-
regular behavior are actually functional for governing. Some economists have
argued that some level of corruption is indeed functional by facilitating trans-
actions, and certainly not worth the resources needed to stamp it out.
More generally, students of informal institutions have argued that particu-
larly in less developed political systems, informal institutions can contribute sig-
nificantly to governance capacity. Helmke and Levitsky (2004), for example,
have developed a model of how informal institutions interact with formal insti-
tutions in governance. They adopt an extremely broad conception of informal
politics, ranging from the overtly corrupt to understandings about appropriate
behavior in legislatures. These all depend upon shared rules and values that are
not codified but which still have a strong impact on behaviors. Further, they ar-
gue that the informality is crucial to the success of many political systems, in-
cluding many systems that may appear to be perfectly capable of governing on
their own. The analytic question that this raises in the context of this paper is to
what extent these informal aspects of governing are functional, and how irregu-
lar they can be and still reside within the bounds of ‘good governance’.
In this paper I will be concerned with a wide range of actions that deviate
from what might be considered an idealized model of governing. In that
model governance would be controlled by values such as universalism,
achievement, and affective neutrality.3 These terms are usually discussed as
components of political culture, and indeed much of the discussion of politi-
                                                          
3 These are, of course, the familiar Parsonian pattern variables.
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cal corruption has a strong culturalist element. These same values have been
used to describe patterns of political and social development. The question I
will be posing is whether the structure of political regimes affects the level of
irregular political activity, and therefore also can we design institutions that
will minimize unwanted forms of irregular politics.
Most of this paper will be concerned with political institutions and their
role in corruption. Much of the discussion of corruption in the public sector
has been concerned with public administration, and with petty officials taking
bribes for moving a file along, or ignoring violations of building codes, or a
host of other relatively minor indiscretions. This type of corruption has been
both more manifest as corruption and easier to control. For example, both
Singapore and Hong Kong once had famously corrupt administrative systems
but have been able to clean them up largely through stringent enforcement.
Political corruption may be more difficult to cope with simply because it is at
times less clearly defined and also because those involved have substantially
greater power within the political system.
3. Institutional Design and Informal Politics
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether formal institutional ar-
rangements have an impact on the level of corruption, and if so what sort of a
theoretical story can we tell that would explain the linkage. A priori, we
might not expect any such linkage, a fact made apparent by recent events in
the United States. The rather blatant corruption of Governor Rod Bogjona-
vich of Illinois has made us aware first that there is a good deal of corruption
at the level of state governments in the United States, and second that the
level of corruption is substantially different across the states (see Table 1).
The marked variations in the level of corruption appear even though the in-
stitutional structures of the state governments are very similar. Indeed, Illinois
identified as one of the more corrupt states is adjacent to Iowa and Wisconsin
which appear to be two of the less corrupt states. The constitutions of all of
these states are similar, but the behavior of individuals in office appears mark-
edly different. Why? Further, if I examine the levels of corruption in the state
governments using some of structural variables that might have an influence,
e.g. the number of elected officials and size of state legislatures, there appears
to be little relationship. Further, to the extent that there is one there are relation-
ships they appear to be inverse to what might have been expected. For exam-
ple, the states in the upper Midwest have a relatively large number of elected
state officials4, but have some of the lowest rates of corruption.
                                                          
4 South Dakota, for example, elects (in addition to the usual officers of governor and lieuten-
ant governor) offices such as Insurance Commissioner, Agriculture Commissioner, and sev-
eral education officials.
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These observations create some doubt about the relevance of macro-level
political structures for explaining corruption, clientelism or other deviations
from ‘good governance’. That said, however, some aspects of more micro
and meso-level structures may be relevant for the explanation than are the
macro-level characteristics of governance arrangements. To examine these
potential relationships more thoroughly I will examine two macro-institutional
characteristics of political systems – presidentialism and federalism (and their
opposites), attempting to provide a logic theoretical explanation for a linkage
and then determining whether there is any support for that logic. I will also
examine the role of electoral systems and parties as meso-level institutional
features that may influence decisions to engage in irregular political behav-
ior.
4. Presidential and Parliamentary Systems
The most familiar dichotomy in institutional design of political systems is the
difference between presidential and parliamentary government. This distinc-
tion has been used to explain a number of aspects of the performance of po-
litical systems, notably the stability of systems (Linz/Valenzuela 1994), and
their general governance capacity. Manfred Schmidt (2002), for example, has
examined the impact of different types of democratic regimes on the general
performance of those regimes. He has used the contrast between ‘majori-
tarian’ and consensual systems as described by Lijphart (1999) and further
uses the logic of negotiated democracy (Scharpf 1993) to describe the con-
sensual forms of governing. Although the evidence used is rather weak,
Schmidt appears convinced that consensual systems do perform better than
do majoritarian systems.
Although the simple dichotomy has substantial utility, it is also a rather
simplistic distinction. There is perhaps less variation among presidential sys-
tems, but there is still some important variation. For example, presidents dif-
fer in their ability to veto legislation, control public spending, and issue their
own decrees without approval of the legislature. Further, the semi-presidential
system (Roper 2002) that attempts to balance the virtues (and vices) of presi-
dential and parliamentary system are themselves rather diverse, with a prin-
cipal difference being the relative powers of presidents and parliaments with
respect to the prime minister.
The variations among parliamentary systems are substantially greater.
One of the most important of these differences is between those few systems
that have a single-party government, as opposed to the more common multi-
party systems.5 Even among the multi-party systems there are marked differ-
                                                          
5 This corresponds closely to Lijphart’s (1999) familar distinction between majoritarian and
consensual governments.
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ences between those systems that have small coalitions versus those such as
Denmark or Belgium that have five or more parties involved. Further, some
coalitions, e.g. those in Sweden, are predictable in advance while others have
to be created after elections and increasingly span the political landscape
from right to left.
Even given the clear structural and procedural differences among these
types of political systems, why should we expect there to be any impact on
the level of informal politics and government? Simply by observation we can
see that presidential regimes tend to have somewhat higher levels of corrup-
tion and clientelism, and indeed of other types of informal governance ar-
rangements. For example, Table II shows the rankings of countries on the
World Bank corruption index related to their type of regime. If we examine
the aggregate figures then there is a relationship, albeit weak. When we in-
troduce levels of economic development, however, the relationships largely
disappear.
Indeed, one might not, a priori, think that presidential systems would be
more subject to corrupt practices. A dominant logic of presidential systems is
a separation of powers (Peters 1997). If the formal arrangements among the
institutions are effective, then the legislature should function as a check on
the powers of the executive to use its powers for corruption or clientelism.
For those formal relationships to function, however, legislatures need to have
the resources (staff, etc.) and the commitment to perform their oversight
function. A (extremely) well-staffed and organized legislature such as the
Congress of the United States may be able to perform that task effectively,
although as will be noted they appear to be engaged in clientelism and cor-
ruption of their own.
Unfortunately, relative few legislatures in presidential regimes appear to
have those resources and are largely ineffective in exercising oversight
(Cox/Morgenstern 2002). Indeed, most legislative bodies in these settings
appear more concerned about using their powers, especially their budgetary
powers, to provide benefits for their constituents and promoting their own ca-
reers. This choice of career strategies may make good sense given that there
may be little to be gained (politically) from exercising oversight while there
may be a great deal to be gained from using the pork barrel.6
There are at least three reasons to expect presidential systems to be more
associated with irregular forms of governing than are parliamentary systems.
The first is that this is actually a spurious relationship, resulting from the
greater number of presidential regimes in Latin American and African coun-
tries with lower levels of economic development and with less institutional-
ized political systems in general. The same argument has, of course, been
made with respect to the apparent instability of presidential regimes (Linz/
                                                          
6 At times oversight appears to be opposition to policies, and if the president is popular politi-
cally questioning his or her policies may have negative political consequences.
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Valenzuela 1994), and the seeming fragility of presidential regimes may be a
function merely of lower levels of economic development (see van der Walle
2003).
The first of the more genuine relationships between presidential regimes
and levels of irregular government is that presidential regimes are, almost by
definition, more personalized with a focus on the leadership of the one indi-
vidual in the center of the system. As well as leadership capacity, being the
president also offers opportunities to distribute numerous benefits to follow-
ers. For example, in the United States the president has approximately 4,500
positions that are legally open for appointment when he takes office.7 Other
presidential systems permit proportionately as many or more legal appoint-
ments, and may also assume that de facto the president can appoint a number
of other officials. For example, even after its attempts to create a functioning
civil service system, the president of Mexico can still appoint numerous pub-
lic employees, even to positions nominally covered by the civil service sys-
tem.8
There are two additional points to be made about the apparent levels of
clientelism in presidential systems as related to the personal power of the
president. The first is that there are a number of official appointments avail-
able to a president, but there are also more informal appointments and pa-
tronage powers in these systems. In part the focus of politics in these systems
on the top executive positions also means that the personal factions within
parties, and within government, emphasizes the ability of would-be leaders to
provide benefits. They may do so by holding other positions in government,
e.g. positions in sub-national governments controlled by the centre. The fac-
tionalism of politics in presidentialist systems such as Uruguay, for example,
leads to a variety of patronage appointment systems associated with different
institutions, e.g. Social Security, within the country.
The second point is that although presidentialist systems tend to have
higher levels of patronage appointments, this seems to be more a matter of
degree than of type. Perhaps because of the increased emphasis on the role of
prime ministers in parliamentary systems, these top officials also have been
increasing their appointment powers. Some of the appointment powers are a
function of changes in the structures of government more generally, with the
creation of more devolved organizations providing more appointment op-
portunities (Skelcher 1998). Especially in multi-party systems the need to
                                                          
7 This is, of course, many fewer than at the height of the spoils system in the Jacksonian era
(White 1954), but the number of appointments has been increasing markedly over the past
several decades as presidents have sought to enhance their control over programs (Light
1995; 2004). Congress must consent to approximately 400 of the more important of these
positions, but most are in the gift of the President.
8 Further, there is some evidence that President Calderon has returned to appointing more of-
ficials than had President Fox (see Mendez 2008).
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provide positions for the adherents of the coalition members may lead to
more appointments.
The second major reason that one can expect greater levels of patronage
and clientelism in presidential party systems has little to do with the regime
type per se, and has more to do with the nature of the political party systems
within those regimes (see also Kunicova/Rose-Ackerman 2005). The basic
argument is that presidential systems tend to have political parties that are fo-
cused toward gaining that one major position. At the extreme there are two
party systems with single member districts for the legislature. In these cases
the candidates tend to be more individual entrepreneurs with highly person-
alized styles of governing, and they therefore require some forms of patron-
age to be able to maintain that personal power base.
Proportional representation electoral systems, that tend to be characteris-
tic of parliamentary systems, also tend to produce strong political parties that
can control the actions of their members in office. Further, those individual
members in the parliament have relatively few resources at their disposal –
most are held by the party. Further, the parties themselves may be less fo-
cused on what they can gain during a short period, in contrast to those seek-
ing control of a central political office. This organizational control of scarce
resources may minimize the personal clientelism, although the parties them-
selves do not tend to be shy in distributing positions to their members, in-
cluding the opportunities to run for public office.
Again, however, the evidence linking electoral systems to clientelism is
not unequivocal. The Irish system is parliamentary and has an STV (single
transferable vote) electoral system, but the common characterization is of a
political system with strong clientelistic ties between members of the lower
house of parliament (Teachta Dálas, TDs) and their constituents. For exam-
ple, Chubb’s (1963) characterizations of the clientelistic relationships have
been amended, but certainly not refuted. More recent studies (Galla-
gher/Komito 2005) have pointed to the continued role of the TDs in constitu-
ency service.
Again, however, the electoral system may play a major role in the pro-
moting clientelism. The STV system creates more of a direct linkage between
voters and their representatives, despite being a form of proportional repre-
sentation. The ability of the voters to choose not only parties but individuals
means that candidates must appeal as individuals, and there are few better
ways of doing that than by providing ‘pork’ for the constituencies. Likewise,
the open list PR (proportional representation) systems used in much of Latin
America, and in some European states, also can contribute to a closer linkage
between constituents and their representatives than does closed list PR sys-
tems which are dominated by the political parties.
The other variable in party systems that may be crucial for explaining
levels of corruption is the type of party finance. At the extreme political par-
ties and more importantly individual candidates in the United States depend
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almost entirely on private funding. As a result, these politicians must con-
stantly scramble for funds and in the process they must make political prom-
ises and deliver policy goods that might easily be argued to be clientelistic or
corrupt. This style of irregular politics tends to be much more acceptable than
even petty administrative corruption, in part indicating the importance of
elaborating the values that are accepted and those which are not when making
statements about corruption.
Although we as external observers tend to classify patronage appointments
and territorial spending as being at least at the margin of corruption, if not actu-
ally corrupt, the discourse in the political systems which use these instruments
extensively tends not to be cast in that direction. For example, in the United
States the discussion of presidential appointment powers more often has been
about the efficiency of the system, and the administrative capacities of the indi-
viduals appointed than about their being corrupt. Even in the more egregious
appointments of the Bush years, the discussion was about policy failure.
Geering and Thacker (2004) attribute the lower level of observed corrup-
tion in parliamentary and unitary systems to the degree of centralization in
these systems and the availability of more unified controls over behavior.
This argument contradicts the usual notion that more checks and balances
within a government will maximize controls. Their findings, and our own ob-
servations above, point toward the need for more overt control structures and
the need to eliminate many of the opportunities for corrupt behavior, that are
presented in more complex institutional structures.
5. Administrative Structures and Corruption
As noted above, a good deal of the corruption that occurs in the public sector
occurs in the administrative system. While to some extent administrative
systems are similar, there are also important differences among those systems
(Peters 2009) that may affect their openness to corruption. At the extreme
systems with few if any rules over personnel recruitment, or procurement or
budgeting are obviously more open to corruption and other irregularities than
are systems with stronger internal regulations.
To some extent the role of bureaucracy in explaining corruption is contra-
dictory and paradoxical. On the one hand, formalized bureaucratic rules and
procedures have been designed in part to prevent corruption and to ensure
that members of the public sector act sine irae ac studio when dealing with
the public. On the other hand, the rigidities usually associated with bureauc-
racies (see Rubinstein/von Maravić, this volume) may make corruption and
clientelism more desirable as means of circumventing those rigidities. If
normal procedures are not able to respond to social needs sufficiently quickly
then bribery and other means of accelerating decisions will become more
valuable for the participants in the administrative process.
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As was argued above, formal structures in bureaucracies may be less im-
portant in explaining the occurrence of corrupt practices than are values and
understandings about appropriate conduct in office. The use of formal insti-
tutions appears capable of helping to create such values, as for example the
anti-corruption office in Hong Kong, but in the end the creation of values
may be more important than building structures.9 That said, some administra-
tive reforms during the past several decades have tended to enhance the op-
portunity for corruption, and the breakup of the traditional civil service in
many systems has eliminated even more constraints on irregular behavior in
public administration.
6. Federalism and Corrupt Practices
Federal versus unitary states is another standard dichotomy in institutional
analysis in comparative politics. To a great extent this dichotomy is clearer
than that between presidential and parliamentary systems. That said there are
both marked differences in both these types of political system. These discus-
sions have been analyzed substantially more for federal systems (see Hueg-
lin/Fenna 2006) than for unitary regimes, although there are certainly marked
differences between the latitude given local communes in the Scandinavian
countries with the relatively strong controls exercised in most Napoleonic re-
gimes (Ongaro 2008).
While the federal/unitary distinction is well known in comparative poli-
tics (Hueglin/Fenna 2006), should it have any influence on the levels of cor-
ruption and clientelism in a political system? One simple hypothesis would
be that if there are more autonomous governments in a political system then
there is simply more opportunity for corruption than in more unified systems.
Further, having multiple levels of government also creates different opportu-
nity structures for politicians so that the ability to deliver pork barrel goods to
a lower level of government may enable a legislator to move into more desir-
able political positions at that lower level, e.g. become a governor (Samuels
2002).
We can also hypothesize that at the sub-national level there is less dis-
tance (geographical and social) between the potential patron and the potential
client. In settings in which patrons and potential clients know each other and
interact more frequently, maintaining any social distance is difficult, and
therefore corruption may be more probable than in systems with greater so-
cial distance. That said, however, the politics in an American state such as
California or in a German Land such as Nordrhein-Westfalen may be as re-
                                                          
9 As in the famous Friedrich-Finer debate, the creation of formalized structures for control
may lead into an infinite regress of control – ipso custodient…
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mote, or more remote, such as that in a smaller country like Estonia or
Malta.10
Finally, sub-national governments tend to have more physical projects –
roads, construction of other type, etc – that may be more subject to corruption
than are less tangible public programs such as pensions or regulatory pro-
grams.11 The procurement process is a major locus for corrupt activity, and if
there are a number of potential bidders – creating a construction company to
build a road does not require a very large investment of capital – with local
contacts then it is perhaps natural that patrimonial practices become common.
In fairness, national level governments also have a good deal of corruption in
areas such as defense contracting, although perhaps for different reasons.
The alternative hypothesis is that having a single government does not
provide any alternative locus for good governance to develop, whereas mul-
tiple governments can do so. For example, Myerson (2006) argues that com-
petition is crucial for democratic accountability and that competition can be
enhanced in multi-level governance systems (see also Bardhan 2002). The
argument is further that having multiple loci providing governance gives op-
portunities for less corrupt governance to develop whereas unitary regimes
tend to enforce uniformity and centralized control, with less chance of evolu-
tion and effective learning.
7. Paradox of Contemporary Governance
One of the paradoxes of contemporary institutional design is that the demands
for more effective and non-corrupt service delivery appear to be occurring in
opposition to much of what has become the conventional wisdom on govern-
ing. Much of what has become that conventional wisdom for improving gov-
ernance is to create more autonomous and more informal structures for making
and delivering public policy (see Christensen/Laegreid 2007). One of the sev-
eral standard recommendations of the New Public Management (NPM) has
been that more autonomous public organizations (agencies) can be more effi-
cient and effective in delivering services. Similarly, the ‘governance’ literature
(Sorenson/Torfing 2007) has argued that self-organizing networks of social
actors will contribute to more effective and democratic governments than those
possible with more traditional political structures.
Both of these styles of reforming the public sector tend to weaken con-
ventional controls and mechanisms of accountability within the public sector.
If the Gerring and Thacker (2004) argument mentioned above is correct then
these reforms are likely to create more opportunities for corrupt behavior.
                                                          
10 I am not arguing that corruption is rife in these countries, only that their small size creates
the great proximity between the potential patron and the potential client.
11 One major exception to that generalization is defense programs that are located in central
government and which are also subject to substantial corruption.
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The NPM reforms have tended to promote the autonomy of public actors and
to provide public managers greater latitude to make decisions on their own.
This enhanced autonomy, combined with the increased opportunities for ap-
pointing public managers from outside the career public service, reduces both
institutional and ethical controls over their actions. There is no certainty that
the New Public Management has increased, or will necessarily increase, lev-
els of corruption, but it does mean that there are many more opportunities for
irregular action within the public sector.
The governance models represent to a great extent an alternative format for
governing that may enhance the opportunities for corruption, albeit generally
not for personal gain so much as for the benefit of members of organizations
involved in the process. Because they tend to involve various social actors in
making decisions in the name of the public, these formats for governing may
represent, in Lowi’s term, the ‘private use of public power’ (Lowi 1973). While
they have been justified in terms of democracy, being a means of involving the
public more directly in governing, networks also involve granting power to the
groups who are considered appropriate for being involved.
The differential involvement of social actors in the processes of govern-
ing raises several questions about the democracy, and probity, of the net-
works format for governance. First, the democratic aspect of the network ar-
gument is weakened when it becomes clearer that not all segments of society
are organized adequately to be able to participate (see Bogason/Musso 2006).
Further, these groups are empowered to make decisions in the name of the
public although they may in fact be representing only their own members.
Thus, in the name of democracy and of enhanced public performance net-
work reforms may have some of the same impact on the actual level of de-
mocracy as do the New Public Management reforms.
For both the NPM approach and governance the basic logic for governing
has been less concerned with problems of corruption than with either effi-
ciency or democracy. Both approaches toward reforming the public sector
appear to assume that the ethical problems are solved in the political systems
where these approaches have been implemented. While the industrialized
democracies in which most of these reforms have been implemented have
developed cultures that do not support corruption, there are changes at the
margin of overt corrupt behavior that lead one to question the contribution of
these schemes to ‘good governance’.
8. Summary
Attempting to link the structures of regimes to levels of corruption is rather
difficult. First, we can find political systems with similar structures with
markedly different levels of corruption, and systems with similar levels of
corruption with rather different structures. The theory that presidential sys-
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tems should be more corrupt seems plausible on its face but any findings of a
relationship appear to be a product, to some extent at least, of the simple fact
that most presidential regimes are in less-developed political and economic
systems that may have greater incentives for corruption, or which have not
had sufficient time to institutionalize controls over corrupt practice.
Further, that distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems
may not be sufficiently fine-grained to capture many of the important differ-
ences among political systems. For example, the capacity of legislative bod-
ies to exercise effective oversight over the executive is not at all identical
across political systems. A legislature with adequate staffing and with a well-
articulated structure will be capable of exercising control and provide coun-
tervailing powers to control the political executive and the bureaucracy.
The basic outcome of this analysis must be that any simple understanding
of institutions as structures is incapable of shedding much light on the likeli-
hood of good governance. There is so much difference within each of the re-
gime types that making any predictions may conceal more than it reveals.
Likewise, the causal linkage between institutional structures and the behav-
iors of the individuals within them is somewhat attenuated so that attempting
to explain something like corruption on the individual level may be difficult,
unless one adopts a conception of institutions that reflects more their value
commitments than their structural features.
Institutions and regime types are important, but explaining how they exert
their importance is more difficult than just asserting it. This paper has sought
to understand how institutions – especially when defined as structures and
regime types – can affect the level of informal political activity in a political
system. Explaining that type of behavior is easier on the wholesale level than
on the retail level, although most of the discussions of administrative corrup-
tion run in the opposite direction.
Table 1: Corruption in the American States
Most Corrupt Least Corrupt
Guilty Officials
per capita
Survey of Journalists Guilty Officials
per capita
Survey of Journalists
North Dakota Rhode Island Nebraska North Dakota
Alaska Louisiana Oregon South Dakota
Louisiana New Mexico New Hampshire Colorado
Mississippi Oklahoma Iowa Maine
Montana Delaware Minnesota Oregon
Kentucky Alabama Kansas Vermont
Alabama Kentucky California Minnesota
Delaware Arizona Utah Montana
South Dakota West Virginia New Mexico Iowa
Florida Illinois Washington Kansas
Source: The New York Times, December 14, 2008.
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Table 2: Mean Corruption Scores
Presidential12 Parliamentary
Total -0.72 -0.83
Above Average GDP Per Capita -1.42 -1.59
Below Average GDP Per Capita -1.04 -0.89
Calculated from World Bank Control of Corruption Data
                                                          
12 Including semi-presidential.
